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1 Introduction
Modal logic of agency is a traditional research field in philosophical logic. Roughly speaking,
the approach adopts the general policy to abstract from making explicit state changes and from
considering the temporal dimension in describing actions. In fact, actions are simply taken to
be relationships between agents and states of affairs. Thus, the conceptual qualification of these
relations is made by using suitable modal operators to represent, for example, that an agent
“brings it about” or “sees to it” that A, or that such agent is “able” to realise A, or again that she
“attempts” to achieve it.
It is well known that modal logic of agency has a number of drawbacks. As recently sum-
marised in [24], the main limit of this approach, as found in the literature, is that it is “too
abstract”. For example, it is not usually captured the difference between the modal qualifica-
tions “sees to it” and “brings it about”. Both expressions are in general represented by a single
modal operator, despite the fact that the former exhibits a clear intentional character, whereas the
latter may refer as well to unintentional actions [11]. Secondly, for the purpose of analysing the
structure of multi-agent contexts it is crucial to distinguish between direct actions and indirect
actions. This is necessary, for example, to account for the notions of influence and control of an
agent over other agents [14, 15, 19, 20]. While these problems may be, or have been, solved by
providing suitable integrations and new operators within the same paradigm of modal logic of
agency, a last drawback is inherent in the paradigm as such. In fact, “sometimes it is essential
to be able to refer to the means by which an agent brings about a state of affairs”, as for exam-
ple by referring to specific actions performed to achieve a goal [24]. As it is well-known, this
shows that modal logic of agency is less expressive than other formal theories of action, such as
dynamic logics. On the other hand, this last limit is also an advantage. Although the abstract-
ness of modal logic of agency does not make the language very expressive in itself, it allows
flexibility for the easy combination of agency with a number of other concepts, such as powers,
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obligations, beliefs, etc, in a multi-modal setting. This perhaps explains why the approach has
been recently used to analyse some crucial aspects of normative and institutional domains (see,
e.g., [3, 9, 14, 15, 19, 20]).
The formal properties of modal logic of agency have been extensively investigated, and a
number of variants and axiomatizations can be found in literature (see, e.g., [1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 17–
22]). Despite this great variety, it is possible to identify a minimal core of axioms that seem to
characterize indisputably some aspects of agency. The recent contributions by Dag Elgesem are
meant to work in this direction [6, 7]. We will focus here on two praxeological notions among
those considered by him1.
The first is the idea of personal and direct action to realise a state of affairs. In the men-
tioned general view, this idea is formalised by the well-known modal operator E, such that a
formula like EiA means that the agent i brings it about that A. Elgesem’s logic of E is a classical
non-normal system [5], namely is closed under logical equivalence, and is characterized by the
following schemas.
EiA→ A (1)
(1) is recognised as valid by almost all theories of agency. It is nothing but the usual axiom T of
modal logic, and it expresses the successfulness of actions which is behind the common reading
of “bring about” concept.
¬Ei> (2)
The axiom (2), also named No, is used to capture the very concept of agency at hand, according
to which the occurrence of any state of affairs, in the scope of Ei, is the result of an action of i.
In other words, if i had not behaved in the way she did, the world might have been different. In
this perspective, at least no agent can bring about what is logically unavoidable.
(EiA∧EiB)→ Ei(A∧B) (3)
This third schema, C or Agglomeration, follows from the co-temporality of actions implicitly
assumed within the paradigm of modal logic of agency. In fact, if the agent i realises A and
B, presumably by performing two distinct actions, it can be also said that i brings it about that
A∧B only if the two actions have been performed at the same time. As it is argued by Elgesem,
however, the converse of 3 must be rejected because, in presence of it, substitution of equivalents
(i) plus 2 make the logic inconsistent whenever at least one action is performed, (ii) gives the
usual rule RM (` A→ B/ `2A→2B), which is not acceptable in the logic for E.
The second praxeological concept, analysed by Elgesem and considered here, is agents’
“practical ability” to realise states of affairs. This praxeological qualification is represented by
the modal operator C. Accordingly, CiA expresses that i is capable of realising A. The logic
for C is quite weak. It is closed as well under logical equivalence and is characterised by the
following principles.
EiA→CiA (4)
1As we will see in a few moments, the two concepts are those of “bring about” and “practical ability”. Elgesem
formalises them as Does and Ability respectively, such that both operators are, as expected, indexed by agents. For
the sake of simplicity, we will adopt a different notation, which is quite common in the literature (see, e.g., [15]).
Thus the first is represented by the operator E, while the second by C. Of course, both are labelled by agents as well.
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This schema states a strong connection between ability and agency. Of course, the latter implies
the former, in presence of axiom (1): If i realises successfully A, it is obvious that i is able to do
this.
¬Ci> (5)
This last axiom is the natural counterpart of schema (2) for E. As we have alluded to, both
express jointly the idea of avoidability, namely that the occurrence of a state of affairs cannot be
caused by one agent if the goal obtains in every state of the world2.
In the next sections we will analyse some aspects of Elgesem’s semantics for the above
operators. The focus will be then on a decisive, but quite solvable, problem arising from his own
semantic characterisation of the logic of agency and ability.
2 An Axiomatization for Agency and Ability
Elgesem’s analysis starts from semantical considerations [6, 7]. His aim is to give a fresh account
of Sommerhoff’s theory of goal-directness. The semantics is given in terms of selection function
models, where a selection function model E is a structure 〈W, f ,v〉 where W is a (non empty) set
of possible worlds, f is a selection function from P(W )×W to P(W ), and v assigns to each
propositional letter a subset of W .3
Each formula corresponds to a set of worlds, the set of worlds where it is true, and a world
describes the formulas true at it; thus a formula corresponds to a state of affairs, and it determines
all worlds where the state of affairs is true. The selection function identifies then the worlds
relative to the actual world where a goal (state of affairs) has been realized.
For convenience, before providing the valuation clauses for the formulas, we define the
notion of truth set, i.e., the set of worlds where a formula is true.
DEFINITION 1. The truth set of a formula A wrt to a modelM , ‖A‖M is thus defined:
‖A‖M = {w ∈W : w M A} .
An Elgesem model is a selection function model E satisfying the following valuation clauses:
2According to Elgesem, the full idea of avoidability requires to focus on two different, but interconnected, aspects.
The first corresponds to the negative conditions stated by (2) and (5). Both schemas are aimed to state that no agent
brings about logical truths. The second claim is that “an agent’s behaviour, when he brings about something, is
instrumental in the production of that which he brings about”. This general idea corresponds to saying, positively
and with respect to any state of affairs A, that “if the agent had not behaved in the way he did when he brought it
about that A, then he might not have brought it about that A”. The last requirement is rendered by defining suitable
dyadic operators and principles which reflect Elgesem’s own philosophical interpretation of agency [7]. This second
aspect will not be considered here, since it does not seem relevant with regard to the aims of this paper.
3Elgesem’s semantics for the modal logic of agency and ability is a structure 〈W, f1, . . . , fn,V 〉 (cf. [7, p. 20]
and [6, p. 54]), where each fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a function as in the structure described above and i is an agent. Since
there are no interactions among the agents and all functions fi are independent from each other and obey the same
conditions, we can restrict ourselves to the case of a single agent. Elgesem also considers some foundational aspects
of the notions he deals with and introduces some additional functions in order to capture the idea of avoidability and
accidence. However those functions do not play any relevant role in the characterisation of the modal operators E and
C. The valuation function and the constraints on the model are given in terms of properties of f . The other functions
are used to specify constraints on concrete instances of f . Finally V is a valuation function while v is an assignment.
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S1. w E p iff w ∈ v(p);
S2. w E ¬A iff w 6E A;
S3. w E A→ B iff w 6E A or w E B;
S4. w E EA iff w ∈ f (‖A‖E ,w);
S5. w E CA iff f (‖A‖E ,w) 6= /0.4
The notion of truth in a model and validity are defined as usual.
It is immediate to see that (S4) and (S5) together imply the validity of (4), namely EA→CA.
Notice that Elgesem uses only one selection function to represent the two modal operators E
and C. This is crucial in his philosophical approach to agency because f (‖A‖,w) corresponds
exactly to the set of worlds where an agent realizes her ability, relative to the actual world w, to
bring about the goal A. In this perspective, ability and agency are two facets of the same general
concept.
Then Elgesem goes on and discusses the conditions required to characterise the modal oper-
ators of agency (E) and ability (C); though the two operators are defined by the same selection
function, he treats them as independent operators (even if C corresponds to the possibility oper-
ator of E, they are not duals, and cannot be defined in terms of each other in the present setting).
To characterise the other principles Elgesem imposes the following conditions on the selec-
tion function f :
E1 f (W,w) = /0;
E2 f (X ,w)∩ f (Y,w)⊆ f (X ∩Y,w).
E3 f (X ,w)⊆ X ;
Condition E1 says that a goal that is realized in every world is not a state the agent is able to
bring about. As an immediate consequence of this constraints we have the validity of (5) and
(2).
Condition E2, corresponding to the agglomeration principle for E (3), is motivated by the
idea that the ability needed for the intersection of A and B is not more general than the ability to
do A and the ability to do B.
Finally E3 makes explicit the idea that in all worlds where an agent realizes her ability to
bring about a goal, the goal is indeed realized. It is easy to see that it validates the success
principle (1).
To sum up, let us recall synoptically Elgesem’s axiomatization for the logic of agency and
ability (let us call the resulting logicL1).
A0 propositional logic
A1 ¬C>,
4From now on, whenever clear from the context we drop subscripts and superscripts.
4
A2 EA∧EB→ E(A∧B),
A3 EA→ A,
A4 EA→CA;
plus Modus Ponens and
A≡ B
EA≡ EBREE
A≡ B
CA≡CBREC (6)
As we have seen Elgesem also considers the principle ¬E>; however this principle is redundant
since it can be easily derived from A1 and the contrapositive of A4.
Another interesting principle, which can be derived from the success axiom for the operator
E (A3) is ¬E⊥.This principle states that nobody can realize an inconsistent (impossible) state.
But, what about the corresponding principle that nobody is capable to produce an inconsistent
state?
¬C⊥ (7)
This principle is valid in the proposed selection function semantics, but, as we shall see in the
next section, is not provable inL1.
Let E be an Elgesem model. For every world w in E we have
w E ¬C⊥ ⇐⇒ w 6E C⊥ ⇐⇒ f (‖⊥‖E ,w) = /0.
According to condition E3 ∀w ∈W, f (X ,w)⊆ X and, ‖⊥‖E = /0; hence f (‖⊥‖E ,w)⊆ ‖⊥‖E =
/0. According to the intended interpretation ¬C⊥ means that an agent is not able to realize the
impossible (here with impossible we understand an inconsistent state of affairs). This reading
seems appropriate in a physical (practical) conception of the notion of ability. However there
are other interpretations where such condition might be relaxed. For example Hintikka [12] pro-
poses a reading where impossible worlds are worlds where we have a partial knowledge of the
structure of the world and some contradictions do not appear to be as such, unless we perform
a deeper analysis of them. A second interpretation where C⊥ can be accepted is when we have
a “normative” reading of C. As we have alluded to, in the last few years logics of agency and
ability have been used, in conjunction with deontic logics, to model the relationships among
(autonomous) agents in agent societies conceived as normative systems [3, 9, 14, 15, 20]. In this
interpretation we can use C to describe, among other types of “normative” actions, the ability
of an agent to create a new normative position. In this perspective, it is indeed possible for a
law-maker to draft an inconsistent norm. However, its inconsistency could prevent it from being
a true “legal” norm, at least in the event it is accepted the view that all norms must be logi-
cally compliable with (and also violable). Of course, a lot depends on the exact axiomatization
adopted for praxeological as well as for deontic notions. If O stands as usual for the deontic
operator of obligation, it may be argued, for example, that O⊥ (and/or O>) are meaningless
and so self-contradictory (this view is adopted, for example, in [15]; see also [23]). But nothing
in theory is against accepting that an agent may be logically able to issue bizarre norms like
O⊥, for the simple reason that any logic for the operator O does not include the axiom T. The
expression CiO⊥ may be thus accepted. Perhaps, the problem at stake here is that the right way
to approach these questions requires to focus on the normative power to issue norms, rather than
on the practical ability to do this. But, of course, this is outside the scope of the paper.
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3 Neighbourhood Models
As we have seen in the previous section ¬C⊥ is valid, but we have alluded that it is not provable
from L1, hence L1 is incomplete wrt the intended semantics. To show that L1 is incomplete
wrt E we have to provide a class of models such that L1 is complete for it and ¬C⊥ is false.
While it is possible to devise a class of selection function models for L1 (see Section 4) we
prefer to introduce models with a different structure.5
A neighbourhood modelN is a structure 〈W,NC,NE ,v〉where W is a set of possible worlds,
NC and NE are functions from W toP(P(W )), and v assign subset of W to atomic letters.
The valuation clauses for atomic and boolean formulas are as usual while those for modal
operators are given below.
DEFINITION 2. Let w be a world inN = 〈W,NC,NE ,v〉:
N1 w N CA iff ‖A‖N ∈ NCw ;
N2 w N EA iff ‖A‖N ∈ NEw .
It is natural to add some conditions on the functions N in neighbourhood models to validate the
axioms A1–A4.
C1 W /∈ NCw ;
C2 if X ∈ NEw and Y ∈ NEw then X ∩Y ∈ NEw ;
C3 if X ∈ NEw then w ∈ X ;
C4 NEw ⊆ NCw .
THEOREM 3. `L1 A iff N A.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of that given in [5] using minimal canonical
models. 2
It is easy to provide a neighbourhood model that falsifies ¬C⊥. Let W = {w}, NEw = /0 and
NCw = { /0}. Here, ‖⊥‖ = /0 ∈ NCw , therefore w C⊥ and w 6 ¬C⊥. Hence we have the following
result:
PROPOSITION 4. 6`L1 ¬C⊥.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4 is thatL1 is incomplete with respect to the intended
selection function semantics E . It is possible, however, to regain completeness by adding ¬C⊥
as axiom toL1 (let us call the resulting logicL2).
PROPOSITION 5. Let N ′ = 〈W,NE ,NC,v〉 a neighbourhood model and E = 〈W, f ,v〉 be an
Elgesem model satisfying the following conditions:
5As we shall see the difference between the two types of semantics is just in the intuition behind them; in fact,
mathematically, they are equivalent and both neighbourhood semantics and selection function semantics are also
known as Scott-Montague semantics (cf. [10]).
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1. w ∈ f (‖A‖E ,w) iff ‖A‖N ′ ∈ NEw ; and
2. f (‖A‖E ,w) 6= /0 and ‖A‖E 6=W iff ‖A‖N ′ ∈ NCw .6
Then E A iff N ′ A.
Moreover E satisfies conditions E1, E2 and E3 iffN ′ satisfies conditions C1–C4, and /0 /∈ NCw ,
for every w ∈W.
The above proposition shows that any selection function models can be transformed in an equiv-
alent neighbourhood models. However such models must satisfy the condition
C5 ∀w, /0 /∈ NCw ,
which is known to correspond to the axiom ¬C⊥. Hence we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 6.
1. `L2 A iff N ′ A;
2. `L2 A iff E A.
The above theorem proves that E does not determine L1 but L2 (i.e., L1 +¬C⊥). In the next
section we will investigate whether there is a class of selection function models that characterises
L1.
4 Completeness Regained
In the previous section we have seen that it is possible to regain completeness by using neigh-
bourhood semantics with two neighbourhood functions, one for C (NC) and one for E (NE) plus
the condition that NE is included in NC. Obviously, by the well-known equivalence between se-
lection function semantics and neighbourhood semantics [10], we can use a semantics with two
selection functions; but what about a selection function semantics with only a common selection
function for the two operators? The answer is positive, and in the rest of this section we show
how to modify the conditions on the selection function f to recover completeness. All we have
to do is to replace the condition E3 with the following condition:
F1 If ‖A‖ 6= /0, then, for all w, f (‖A‖,w)⊆ ‖A‖; otherwise w /∈ f (‖A‖,w).
It is immediate to give a counter-model for ¬C⊥: Let W = {w1,w2} and f ( /0,w1) = {w2}. Since
f ( /0,w1) 6= /0, and w1 /∈ f ( /0,w1) we have that w1 C⊥.
As a first result for this semantics we show that axioms are valid in it and the inference rules
preserve validity. We useS to denote an Elgesem model that satisfies condition F1.
THEOREM 7. If `L1 A then S A.
6The condition that ‖A‖E 6=W is due to the axiom A1, which requires it.
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Proof. The only not trivial case is that of axiom A2, since its characteristic condition E2 and
F1 are entangle together in this semantics. Condition E2 takes care of the majority of cases,
but we have to be careful since it is possible that the conjunction of A and B is inconsis-
tent. If w  EA∧EB, then w ∈ ‖EA∧EB‖; thus w ∈ ‖EA‖ ∩ ‖EB‖, which means that w ∈
f (‖A‖,w) and w ∈ f (‖B‖,w). According to condition F1 we have ‖A‖ 6= /0 and ‖B‖ 6= /0,which
implies that f (‖A‖,w) ⊆ ‖A‖ and f (‖B‖,w) ⊆ ‖B‖. On the other hand it is possible that
‖A∧ B‖ = /0, which means that w /∈ f (‖A∧ B‖,w). If this is the case then ‖A‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = /0;
hence f (‖A‖,w)∩ f (‖B‖,w) = /0. On the other hand if ‖A‖ = /0 (or ‖B‖ = /0) then ‖A∧B‖ = /0
and so f (‖A‖,w) = f (‖A∧B‖,w). A ≡ B iff ‖A‖ = ‖B‖. In particular if ‖A‖ = ‖B‖ = /0, then
f (‖A‖,w) = f (‖B‖,w). 2
The proof for the completeness is based on canonical models.
DEFINITION 8. A selection function canonical model is a structureSc = 〈W, f ,v〉 such that:
• W is the set of allL1-maximal consistent sets;
• v is an Elgesem valuation function such that, for all atomic proposition p, w  p iff p ∈ w.
• f :P(W )×W 7→P(W ) is thus defined:
– if CA /∈ w, then f ([A]Sc ,w) = /0; otherwise
– if [A]Sc = /0, then f ([A]Sc ,w) =W −{w},
– if [A]Sc 6= /0, then f ([A]Sc ,w) = [EA]Sc .
where [A]Sc , the membership set of a formula A, is defined as follows: [A]Sc = {w ∈W : A ∈ w}.
An immediate consequence of the above construction and Lindebaum’s Lemma is the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 9. LetSc be a canonical selection function model 〈W, f ,v〉, then:
• [A]Sc = /0 iff A≡⊥.
• |W |> 1.
• If A 6≡ > and A 6≡ ⊥, then [EA]Sc 6= /0.
LEMMA 10. For every world w ∈W inSc, and every formula A, w Sc A iff A ∈ w.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of the formula. The inductive base
is given by the basic condition on the valuation function for canonical models. Furthermore we
consider only the case of modal operators.
If w  EA, then by the evaluation function we have w ∈ f (‖A‖,w); by the inductive hypoth-
esis w ∈ f ([A],w), thus w ∈ [EA], therefore EA ∈ w.
If EA∈w, then this implies that CA∈w and A∈w. Since w is consistent A 6≡ ⊥ and [A] 6= /0;
thus f ([A],w) = [EA] and then w∈ f ([A],w). By the inductive hypothesis w∈ f (‖A‖,w), which
implies w  EA.
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If wCA then f (‖A‖,w) 6= /0, and by the inductive hypothesis f ([A],w) 6= /0; by construction
CA ∈ w.
If CA ∈ w, then either f ([A],w) = [EA] or f ([A],w) = W −{w}. Clearly A cannot be >,
thus, according to Proposition 9, f ([A],w) 6= /0, and by the inductive hypothesis so is f (‖A‖,w);
therefore w CA. 2
LEMMA 11. Sc satisfies conditions E1, E2, and F1.
Proof. ¬C> is an axiom, so ¬C> ∈ w, for every world w; hence C> /∈ w. By the construction
of canonical models we have f ([>],w) = /0. Since [>] =W , we have f (W,w) = /0.
If w ∈ f ([A],w)∩ f ([B],w), then w ∈ f ([A],w) and w ∈ f ([B],w). This means that [A] 6= /0
and [B] 6= /0. From this we obtain that EA∈w and EB∈w. Consequently EA∧EB∈w and by the
property of maximal consistent sets E(A∧B) ∈ w. All we have to prove now is that [A∧B] 6= /0.
To prove it we can use the same argument we have developed in the proof of Theorem 7 when
we have shown that EA∧EB→ E(A∧B) is valid.
If A ≡ ⊥ then either f ([A],w) = W −{w} or f ([A],w) = /0. In both cases w /∈ f ([A],w). If
A 6≡ ⊥, then, if CA ∈ w, f ([A],w) = [EA]. But for every world x if EA ∈ x then A ∈ x; therefore
f ([A],w)⊆ [A]. On the other hand if CA /∈w, then f ([A],w) = /0, thus, trivially f ([A],w)⊆ [A].2
From the two Lemmata above we obtain thatL1 is complete with respect toS .
THEOREM 12. `L1 A iff S A.
5 Non-normal Worlds and Relational Models
In the previous sections we have examined Elgesem’s modal logic of agency and ability using
semantics with different flavours. In general the selection function semantics and neighbour-
hood semantics give raise to the same structure: the selection function semantics focuses on the
worlds where some actions can be realized in relation to a given world, while the neighbourhood
semantics identifies the actions (formulas) that can be completed successfully in a given world.
In Section 4 we proposed a characterization ofL1 based on models satisfying condition F1.
According to the intended reading f ( /0,w) is the set of worlds where the agent realizes his/her
ability to bring about an impossible goal (whatever an impossible goal is). So in some senses,
f ( /0,w) corresponds to a set of impossible or imaginary worlds7. At any rate, the technical
machinery of impossible (non-normal, queer) worlds offers us the opportunity to present an
alternative class of Elgesem’s models for L1. All we have to do is to supplement the set W of
possible worlds with the impossible world w⊥, to establish that for every formula A, w⊥  A,
and to define validity as validity at the normal worlds. The revised semantics makes explicit
the need for impossible worlds –after all, if we assume that agents might have the ability to
realize the impossible, it seems plausible to have a semantic counterpart for this notion. Hansson
and Ga¨rdenfors [10] point out that it is possible to destroy the general dependency of modal
operators on the underlying semantic structure (in the case at hand the selection function f , and
7It is beyond the scope of the paper to give a characterisation of impossible worlds. All we ask for is that non-
normal/impossible worlds are worlds whose rules and laws are different from the rules and laws of the normal worlds.
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the accessibility relation R in relational models) by using non-normal/impossible worlds obeying
to different logical rules.
Technically non-normal worlds deny the general idea behind intensional semantics that the
value of modal formulas at a world w depends on the values of other formulas in other worlds,
and validity is defined as validity at the normal worlds. Although the philosophical intuition
behind non-normal worlds is sound, it commits us to postulate their existence; what is more
is that its treatment is rather unsatisfactory: they are taken as black-boxes without any further
analysis of their (internal) structure. In this way, we fail to recognise the potential multiplicity
of types of non-normal worlds. A more appropriate solution is to recast the semantics with some
more general type of dependence relation between truth of modal formulas and truth in other
worlds [10].
Scott-Montague models have been devised, originally, to overcome the drawback of non-
normal worlds we just have alluded to; but, for Elgesem’s models, we have to reintroduce them,
either implicitly or explicitly. If we have to reinstate non-normal/impossible worlds in order to
prevent ¬C⊥ to be valid in Elgesem’s models, then we overstep the very own idea motivating
this type of semantics.
Since non-normal worlds are required, either implicitly or explicitly, in Elgesem’s models
the advantages of using a selection function semantics instead of relational models with non-
normal worlds is lost. One could then ask if it is possible to devise a relational model for L1
(andL2). In the rest of this section we will investigate this issue.
Classical modal logics are characterised by models with the following structure [8]: 〈W,N,R∗,v〉where
W , v are as before, N ⊆W is the set of normal worlds, and R∗ is a set of binary relations over
N×W . The valuation clause for 2 is
w 2A iff w ∈ N and ∃R ∈ R∗ such that ∀x(wRx iff x  A) (8)
The set of non-normal world is denoted by Q (where Q =W −N). Alternatively we could define
a model as 〈W,Q,R∗,v〉. Clearly if w ∈Q, for any formula A, w 62A. Worlds in Q corresponds
to worlds in a neighbourhood model with empty neighbourhoods.
Now to accommodate C and E we have to combine one model for the E component and one
model for the C components. Fortunately the two operators are related by axiom A4, thus we
can adopt the structure8 〈W,QE ,QC,RE ,RC,v〉where W is a set of possible worlds, QE and QC
are set of non-normal worlds such that QC ⊆ QE , RE and RC are sets of binary relations with
signature W −QX ×W , and v is an assignment. Moreover
R1 ∀R ∈ RC∀w∃x¬(wRx) (all relations in RC are point-wise non-universal);
R2 ∀w /∈ QE∀R,S ∈ RE∃T ∈ RE such that Rw ∩ Sw = Tw (RE is point-wise closed under inter-
section);
R3 ∀R ∈ RE∀w(wRw) (all relations in RE are reflexive);
R4 ∀w /∈ QE∀R ∈ RE∃R′ ∈ RC such that Rw = R′w (the relations in RE are sub-relations of rela-
tions in RC);
8From now on we will use X as a variable ranging over C,E.
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R5 ∀R ∈ RC∀w∃x(wRx) (all relations in RC are serial).
As we shall seeL1 is determined by the class of relational models satisfying R1–R4, whileL2
by R1–R5. To prove these results we are going to show that for each relational model there
is an equivalent neighbourhood model, and for every (finite) neighbourhood model there is an
equivalent relational model.
Before proving this result we give an auxiliary lemma about sufficient conditions to ensure
the equivalence of relational and neighbourhood models. In what follows we will use Rw, for
R ∈ RX to denote the set of worlds accessible from w using the relation R, formally: if R ∈ RX ,
then Rw = {w′ ∈W : wRw′}.
LEMMA 13. LetN = 〈W,NE ,NC,v〉 be a neighbourhood model andR= 〈W,QE ,QC,RE ,RC,v〉
be a relational model such that
1. ∀w ∈W if NXw , then ∀x ∈ NXw∃R ∈ RX such that x = Rw, and
2. ∀w ∈W if w /∈ Q, then ∀R ∈ RX∃x ∈ NXw such that x = Rw.
Then for all formulas A: N A iff R A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. The two models have the same set of
possible worlds and the same assignment, thus they agree on every propositional variable. For
the inductive step and the modal operators all we have to do is to apply the condition 1 and 2. 2
For every relational model we can generate an equivalent neighbourhood model where NXw ={
Rw : R ∈ RX
}
. For the other direction, on the other hand, we have to be careful. Beside the
constraints dictated by the internal structure of the model we have to ensure that the set of
relations generated from NEw is closed under intersection and the relations are serial if we want
to satisfy R5. The idea is the same as in the other direction: we use the sets in NXw to create
instances of relations in RX . Here the problem is that given two worlds w and w′ it is very likely
that |NEw | 6= |NEw′ |; hence w generates |NEw | sub-relations and w′ generates |NEw′ | sub-relations,
thus there are sub-relations without elements in relation with w. A simple solution to obviate
this problem is to pick a fixed but arbitrary x ∈ NEw for all the additional relations.
THEOREM 14.
1. For every (finite) relational modelM there is an equivalent (finite) neighbourhood model
N such that ifR satisfies Rn thenN satisfies Cn (for 1≤ n≤ 5).
2. For every finite neighbourhood modelN there is an equivalent finite relational modelR
such that ifN satisfies Cn thenR satisfies Rn (for 1≤ n≤ 5).
Proof. First of all the models will have the same set of worlds and the same assignment, thus
all we have to show is that it is possible to generate appropriate sets of relations from the given
neighbourhood functions and appropriate neighbourhood functions from the given sets of rela-
tions.
Part 1. Given a (finite) relational modelR we can generate an equivalent (finite) neighbourhood
model as follows:
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• If w ∈ QX then NXw = /0; otherwise
• NXw =
{
Rw : R ∈ RX
}
.
It is immediate to verify that the conditions of Lemma 13 are satisfied by the models obtained
from the above construction, therefore the generated models are equivalent to the generating
models.
Part 2. To build a finite relation model from a finite neighbourhood model we use the following
construction.
For each NEw and NCw let ΣEw and ΣCw be sequences of all the elements in NEw and NCw such that
if i≤ |NEw |, then ΣEw,i = ΣCw,i (we use ΣXw,i to indicate the i-th element of ΣXw). Moreover
e = max
{|NEw | : w ∈W} c = max{|NCw | : w ∈W} .
Then
RE =
⋃
1≤i≤e
REi R
C =
⋃
1≤i≤c
RCi
where
REi =
{
(w,w′) : w /∈ QE and w′ ∈ α(w, i)}
RCi =
{
(w,w′) : w /∈ QC and w′ ∈ γ(w, i)}
where α and γ are partial functions with signature α : W ×N 7→ NE and γ : W ×N 7→ NC such
that:
α(w, i) =

undefined if i > e or NEw = /0
ΣEw,i if i≤ |NEw |
ΣEw,1 otherwise
and
γ(w, i) =

undefined if i > e+ c or NCw = /0
ΣCw,i if i≤ |NEw |
ΣC
w,i−e+|NCw | if e < i≤ e+ |N
C
w |− |NEw |
ΣCw,1 otherwise
It is easy to verify that the models obtained from the above construction obey to the conditions
of Lemma 16; consequently this construction produces equivalent models. 2
Due to the above procedure to generate such relational models, in the case of infiniteN orN ′
models we would get non-enumerable infinitary relational structures. To avoid these complexi-
ties, it is sufficient to considerN andN ′ when they are finite. This is possible by preliminarily
showing that L1 and L2 have the finite model property wrt the neighbourhood models previ-
ously defined. The fmp follows immediately from the results of Lewis [16] and [25] that every
classical non-iterative modal logic has the finite model property.9 Clearly L1 and L2 are non-
iterative thus we have the following theorem.
9A modal logic is non-iterative iff it can be axiomatized by using only non-iterative axioms. A formula (axiom)
A is non-iterative iff for every subformula 2iB/3iB of A, B does not contain a modal operator.
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THEOREM 15. L1 andL2 have the fmp.
We can now prove the completeness of the L1 and L2 with respect to the relational models
developed in this section.
THEOREM 16. Let R1 be a relational model satisfying R1–R4, and R2 be a relational model
satisfying R1–R5; then
1. `L1 A iff R1 A;
2. `L2 A iff R2 A.
Proof. Let us consider only L1. From Theorem 3 we know that N A → `L1 A, which is
equivalent to saying that 6`L1 A → 6N A. Since L1 has the finite model property, there is a
finite model NFIN and a world w in it such that w NFIN ¬A According to Proposition 14 and
the generation of the corresponding relational model w R1 ¬A which implies 6R1 A Then,
6`L1 A→ 6R1 A and so R1 A ⇐⇒ `L1 A The proof forL2 andR2 is analogous. 2
Here we want to propose a simple interpretation of relational models: the capability of an
agent to realize a particular state A depends on his/her ability to perform some actions in the
situation described by the then actual world. Accordingly each accessibility relation corresponds
to a concrete action. In this perspective non-normal worlds are just situations where an agent
has no possibility to perform any action.
6 Discussion
When we consider the semantics developed by Elgesem we have to notice that he uses only
one selection function to represent the two modal operators instead of the two neighbourhood
functions of Section 3. This amounts to say that Elgesem considers agency and ability as two
facets of the same phenomenon –the phenomenon described by the selection function. Thus
to discern the two concepts he has to adopt two different valuation clauses. In particular the
condition for E is the condition for a 2 operator, while that for C is the condition used for a
3 operator. However these conditions, in the context of non-normal modal logic, do not imply
that 3 is the dual of 2. On the contrary the neighbourhood semantics assumes two separate but
related modal operators.
It has been argued that an agent can carry out an action successfully if she has the ability as
well as the opportunity do to it. Indeed Elgesem studies the relationships between ability and
agency, and he correctly realizes that agency implies opportunity, i.e., EA → OpA, where Op is
the modal operator for opportunity. But the notion of opportunity is given in terms of agency,
i.e., OpA ≡ (E¬A∨A). Therefore we believe that the semantics proposed by Elgesem does not
fully capture the idea that agency consists of ability plus opportunity since those three notions
are represented by the same selection function. The other semantics do recognise that ability
alone is not enough to represent agency and that it has to be supplemented by something else.
Finally Elgesem semantics requires the introduction (either implicitly or explicitly) of non-
normal worlds, but their interpretation is not satisfactory; on the contrary the interpretation we
have proposed for non-normal worlds seems to fit nicely with the intended reading of the acces-
sibility relations for this type of logics.
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